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Abstract
Panama and Nicaragua have both recently changed their recognition of statehood from Taiwan,
formally known as the Republic of China, to China, formally known as the People’s Republic of
China. Panama and Nicaragua are only a part of a larger global community that is turning away
from Taiwan and towards China, as China grows as an economic, political, and military
superpower. However, with a majority of Taiwan’s remaining allies calling Latin America and
the Caribbean home, these switches in recognition act as an omen for Taiwanese sovereignty.
Overall, Panama and Nicaragua changed their recognition due to China’s political and economic
dominance, as well as due to a general shifting sentiment in Central America away from
historical United States superiority in the region.
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Introduction
In today’s multipolar environment, it is difficult for smaller states to exert meaningful
influence on superpowers like the US and China. However, an international situation such as the
battle for recognition between Taiwan and China creates an opportunity for the aforementioned
smaller states. Specifically, countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are uniquely
situated to wield power in this conflict as they are home to a wealth of natural resources, and are
geographically positioned strategically near the US.
As of early 2022, Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), is
internationally recognized as a state by 14 sovereign states. This means that 14 countries
maintain relations with the ROC as an independently sovereign body. Additionally, those 14
states maintain the official stance that the ROC is the “real” China, while mainland China, also
known as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), remains unrecognized, and they do not practice
diplomatic relations with the PRC. Importantly, eight of those 14 states are in Latin America and
the Caribbean.
As the majority of its diplomatic allies are in LAC, the ROC seeks to uphold its relations
and support its allies in the region as much as possible. Recently, the PRC has become more
aggressive diplomatically, leading multiple LAC countries to switch their recognition from the
ROC to the PRC. Interestingly, two countries that are very different politically, Panama and
Nicaragua, both recently switched their recognition to the PRC (Panama in 2017 and Nicaragua
in 2021). This paper will explore why these states switched their recognition through
investigations of Panama and Nicaragua’s current political situations and relations with the PRC
and the ROC. Additionally, it will consider the ROC and the PRC’s interests in the region, and
how these countries interact via soft power initiatives like official development assistance
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(ODA), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), vaccine diplomacy, and various free trade agreements
(FTA). Finally, this paper will analyze the Monroe Doctrine, the Taiwan Allies International
Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, the Joint Communiqués establishing
relations between the actors, the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018, the
FTAs between Taiwan and its former allies, and communications between Panama and China
about development projects. Through these documents, this paper will assess how burgeoning
relationships between Panama and the PRC, as well as Nicaragua and the PRC, may be
beneficial for said LAC countries, but they could be detrimental to the ROC and its claim to
sovereignty as it loses key diplomatic partners in the region.
The Current Situation Between China and Taiwan
The ongoing battle for recognition between China and Taiwan formally began in 1927
with the start of the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). The KMT quasi-ruled mainland China from 1912-1949 until the CCP
forced the KMT to retreat to Taiwan, an island off the coast of the mainland. From there, the
CCP, led by Mao Zedong, retained jurisdiction over mainland China, at least hypothetically.
Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the KMT, established the ROC on Taiwan, and declared Taiwan
to be the true China. With the end of World War II, the US and its allies recognized, that is
initiated formal diplomatic relations with, the ROC over Mao’s newly formed PRC on mainland
China. Recognition in this case is legally considered de jure, as the US utilized its sovereign
ability to recognize whichever state it would like, ignoring the de facto legitimacy of the PRC.
Furthermore, this recognition was due to the fact that the ROC was a practicing democracy, and
as the CCP ruled over the PRC, it became natural ally for the USSR. For this reason, the ROC
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took control of China’s permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and enjoyed broad
acceptance worldwide.
However, in February of 1972, the President of the United States Richard Nixon released
the Shanghai Communiqué, which acknowledged that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan
Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China” (United States, White
House, Nixon Administration online). This official statement, along with its expulsion from the
UN Security Council, initiated a global breaking of relations with the ROC. Further, the
Shanghai Communiqué set the standard for the “One China Policy,” which simply stated means
that there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of it. Oddly enough, due to domestic politics, the US
did not officially switch its recognition from the ROC to the PRC until 1979, but once it did, the
ROC had lost its strongest ally. That being said, and even under the One China Policy, the US
still maintains informal relations with the ROC through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and
the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative of 2019. This relationship
was due to the US and ROC’s historical partnership, despite the fact that the One China Policy
has become the basis of US-Chinese relations. Domestically, the American public is inclined to
side with the ROC over the PRC due to its democratic and capitalist systems, so any move to
sever ties with the ROC would be met with public outrage in the US. As a result, the American
Institute in Taiwan acts as an informal US embassy to the ROC, with “retired” US Foreign
Service Officers operating in the stead of an embassy. Thus, the US still supports states who
recognize the ROC over the PRC, especially its allies in LAC.
Relations between Taiwan and China have recently begun to deteriorate, specifically after
the election of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016. From
2008 to 2016, the PRC and the ROC had reached a mutual agreement to stop competing for
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recognition and allies. However, the PRC reneged on that agreement when President Tsai took
office due to her party’s progressive and anti-PRC platform. It was at that time that the PRC
aggressively sought allies in LAC, quickly establishing relations with Panama, the Dominican
Republic, and El Salvador (Teng, Republic of China on Taiwan's Relations wtih Latin America
(1990-2020) 186). China’s aggressive soft power maneuvers garner it more official allies every
year, yet Taiwan still maintains ties with many of its former allies. For instance, the FTA
between Panama and Taiwan is still in effect. All in all, Taiwan’s dwindling foreign relations
and decline in allies may indicate a future unification with the Chinese mainland. That being
said, and with no promise of unification in the near future, individual countries may decide to
utilize their own sovereign right to foreign relations, thereby choosing whether to recognize the
ROC or the PRC as the “real China.” Currently, the reality is that only a minority of states
recognize the ROC. The question is though, why did Panama and Nicaragua recently choose to
ally themselves with the PRC over the ROC? What about these actors changed to initiate such a
dramatic shift in international policy? The first indicators of international behavior and policy
might lie within the countries and their political situations themselves.
Politics in Panama and Nicaragua
Panamanian Politics Circa 2017
Panama switched its recognition from the ROC to the PRC in June of 2017 during Juan
Carlos Valera’s presidency. Importantly, China was already investing millions of dollars into
projects in Panama prior to this switch in recognition. For example, China signed a 99-year lease
for Panama’s Margarita Island port in 2016. Therefore, while Panama was maintaining
diplomatic relations with the ROC, it was also reaping economic benefits from pre-established
ties with the PRC. So why did Panama change its ties, if not to seek greater economic aid?
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Former president Juan Carlos Valera was in office from 2014 to 2019 and led the
Panameñista Party, a nationalist Panamanian party. Prior to his tenure, the presidents of Panama
hailed from center right and center left leaning parties. This might indicate that Valera’s
nationalistic tendencies drove the switch in recognition, as it was in Panama’s national interest to
initiate formal relations with the rising PRC superpower. Significantly, Valera had prior work
experience with the PRC, and therefore saw switching relations as a way to bolster the
Panamanian economy in a time when Panama faced tensions in its relations with the US.
Additionally, the administration elected after Valera was pro-US, which in turn made
establishing relations with the PRC more difficult. For instance, Panama’s government halted
FTA negotiations with the PRC after Valera left office. However, experts cite Taiwan’s change
of leadership to President Tsai in 2016 as the main reason why Panama switched its formal
recognition to China, thereby paying little heed to the political inner workings of Panama at the
time.
Importantly, language present in both the establishment of relations between Panama and
the PRC, and the reestablishment of relations between Nicaragua and the PRC, is extremely
similar, even though the political situations in Panama and Nicaragua are disparate. In both
instances, the PRC issued joint communiqués with Panama in 2017 and Nicaragua in 2021,
entitled Comunicado Conjunto entre la República de Panamá y la República Popular China sobre
el Establecimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas1 and Comunicado Conjunto entre la República
Popular China y la República de Nicaragua sobre el Restablecimiento de Relaciones
Diplomáticas2, respectively. The language in both of these communiqués is nearly identical,
Translation by Roxanne Rogers: Joint Communiqué between the Republic of Panama and the People’s Republic of
China on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
2
Translation by Roxanne Rogers: Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of
Nicaragua on the Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations
1
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stating that relations are established “a la luz de los intereses y el deseo de ambos pueblos,”3 and
that both Panama and Nicaragua “reconoce[n] que existe una sola China en el mundo, el
Gobierno de la República Popular China es el único Gobierno legítimo que representa a toda
China, y Taiwán forma parte inalienable del territorio chino,”4 (Republic of Panama and People's
Republic of China 1).
On the surface these agreements legally establish relations between two consenting states,
acknowledging the fact that this establishment is in the best interest of both parties. This is the
very basis of international relations and the practice of sovereignty, but there is more to these
agreements than just the establishment of diplomatic relations. Panama and Nicaragua also must
adhere to the One China Policy, which is the foundation of US-China relations. They also
renounce their ties with Taiwan and officially recognize that Taiwan is a part of China, a
complete reversal of years of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Significantly, neither Panama
nor Nicaragua added special clauses to the communiqué that required China to do anything
special in return for diplomatic recognition. This indicates that China is in the seat of power in
negotiations, even though Panama and Nicaragua had the final bargaining chip: their official
relations with Taiwan. In the case of Panama specifically, China seemed to have used
recognition as a tool to irritate and weaken Taiwan, meaning that China initiated the switch in
recognition, not Panama. However, the situation is extremely different in Nicaragua.

Translation by Roxanne Rogers: “in light of the interests and desires of both states”
Translation by Roxanne Rogers: “recognize that there is only one China, the government of the PRC is the only
legitimate government that represents all of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.”
3
4
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Nicaragua and Daniel Ortega
Nicaragua is the most recent state to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the
PRC in December of 2021, and as it was five years after President Tsai’s election in Taiwan,
there must be something more at play. First and foremost, Nicaraguan politics are significantly
different from Panamanian politics. The Nicaraguan government is run by the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN), led by Daniel Ortega as president, and his wife Rosario
Murillo as vice president. With all of this consolidated power, Ortega can essentially control all
Nicaraguan foreign policy with ease. Ortega first came into power in 1985, during which time he
changed Nicaragua’s recognition of the ROC to the PRC, citing their political similarities as the
reason for the switch. This was later reversed in 1990 when the National Opposition Union
(UNO) came into power over Ortega. However, Ortega won the 2006 presidential election and
has been in power ever since. His administration has been characterized by “extreme poverty…
organized crime… police brutality…” and much more (Tase online).
In 2018, protests started against Ortega and his government after he passed a bill to tax
retiree’s pension checks. These peaceful protests quickly turned violent as Ortega’s forces killed
hundreds and injured thousands of demonstrators. After a month of protests, “70% of
Nicaraguans wanted Ortega…to resign,” (Waddell online). However, as Ortega and Murillo have
complete control of all branches of the government, and have obtained a super majority through
election manipulation in the National Assembly, he is able to “change any law, including the
constitution,” (US Department of State online). As such, Ortega aggressively cracked down on
the protesters to solidify his power, instigating a human rights crisis that angered the
international community. For example, in December of 2018, the US government passed the
Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act which imposed sanctions on significant leaders
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in Ortega’s administration, like Murillo, and took “action to restrict international financial
institutions, including those affiliated with the World Bank Group and the Inter-American
Development Bank, from extending financial or technical assistance to Nicaragua's government,”
(Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 online). On top of those sanctions, the
US government stopped foreign aid to Ortega’s government, which seriously affected the
Nicaraguan economy. Nicaragua’s GDP has contracted since the 2018 protests, maintaining its
position as the second poorest state in the Western Hemisphere. Importantly, the US is
Nicaragua’s largest trading partner, even with all of the sanctions in place. 49% of Nicaragua’s
exports are destined for the US, and 22% of its exports come from the US. Tourism from the US
is also another large contributor to the Nicaraguan economy, which has declined in the wake of
the COVID-19 pandemic (US Department of State online).
Nicaragua’s financial relations with the US are significant here, as the US is Taiwan’s
main supporter in the Western Hemisphere. However, Nicaragua’s switch of recognition might
be less about Taiwan and more about China. China’s BRI is very attractive to a poorer country
like Nicaragua, and as the US is no longer providing foreign aid to the Ortega government, China
seems like a more viable financial partner. Additionally, while Taiwan has a prosperous
economy and is ready and able to provide foreign aid to its allies, China simply has more to offer
as it is ruled by a more authoritarian government. For example, Taiwan is a democracy and
ideologically acts as such. Therefore, when the protests in Nicaragua turned into a dramatic
violation of human rights and other democracies in the world condemned the Ortega
government, Taiwan could not do so out of fear that it would lose an ally. Even with evidence
that foreign aid to Nicaragua just goes to benefitting Ortega and his supporters, Taiwan
continued to send aid to secure its relationship. In 2014, when the Grand Interoceanic Canal
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project was announced, something that will be discussed below as a part of China’s BRI, Taiwan
drastically increased its foreign aid to Nicaragua, from $9.2 million in 2013 to $18.6 million in
2015 (Arcia 179). This aid and other loans from Taiwan have been criticized by officials in the
US, causing some to be put on hold. Thus, Taiwan and Nicaragua were often stuck in a dance
between appeasing the US and acting within their own national interests. China is also stuck in
this position, as it has denied Nicaragua foreign aid in the past to strengthen its relationship with
the US. For these reasons, Nicaragua’s change in recognition is driven by economic need, but
that is not the only motivator in the matter.
China, Taiwan, and the US and Their Interests in Panama and Nicaragua
China and Taiwan have various primary and secondary reasons for becoming involved
with Panama and Nicaragua, but why is the US involved? Aside from its involvement in the
negotiations of the One China Policy, the US has had a vital national interest in protecting all
Western Hemispheric countries from outside interference since the 19th century. On December 2,
1823, President James Monroe of the United States addressed Congress, setting out what is now
known as the “Monroe Doctrine.” In essence, the doctrine states that:
We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on
their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to
our peace and safety (Monroe online).
To paraphrase, Monroe declared that any action made by any external power to interfere with
states in the Western Hemisphere would be considered an act against the security of the US. At
the time, this statement was more of a warning against colonizing powers to stay out of what
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became known as the US’s sphere of influence, but modern US administrations use it today to
repel super powers, including China, from the region. For instance, former president Donald
Trump took afront to China’s encroachment in the region, especially after 2017, seeing as he saw
China to be the largest threat facing the US. This perceived encroachment accounts for the
passing of the TAIPEI Act in 2019, which “requires the Department of State to annually report to
Congress on steps the State Department has taken to help strengthen Taiwan's diplomatic
relationships and partnerships around the world,” (Taiwan Allies International Protection and
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 online).
The TAIPEI Act could be interpreted as a bill to help Taiwan and its dwindling
diplomatic allies, especially in LAC, as that is a part of the US’s sphere of influence. A more
accurate interpretation of the TAIPEI Act illustrates that the Trump administration was acting in
the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and protecting its sphere of influence from more powerful
global actors, like China. The fact of the matter is that the US sees China as a threat and Taiwan
as an ally that it can easily manipulate due to their power differences. While Trump’s critics saw
this as a particularly hawkish stance, it was mainly a modern reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine.
While the US clearly wants to protect its allies in the region and secure its sphere of
influence, China has a larger variety of reasons for becoming involved in Panama and Nicaragua.
China’s interest in LAC began in the 1950s as the CCP started communist propaganda
campaigns in various states. The CCP then faced setbacks during the Sino-Soviet split in the
1960s, as communist LAC countries, specifically Cuba, looked to the USSR for aid and direction
(Wise 46). The 1950s and 60s did set a foundation for future economic relationships with LAC
countries, which began to boom with China’s Open Door Policy in the early 1980s. Thus,
China’s primary reasons for interactions in the region became economic and political as China
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sought out natural resources and a growing opportunity for the BRI, and looked to be a leader
and example for LAC countries to further sabotage US efforts in the region as (Wise 45).
Notably, China is the country with the largest population in the world, the second largest
economy run by primarily manufacturing, and is therefore in desperate need of natural resources.
This is why, for instance, China focuses so much time and energy on its relationships with
Ecuador and Venezuela, as both of those states are oil exporters. China also seizes the
opportunity to export goods and services to LAC countries that not only expands its economy,
but also improves its image via soft power. For example, after Panama recognized China in
2017, China provided “material resources” (Wise 54) in the form of vital upgrades to the Panama
Canal that the US could not, or would not, provide. In this sense, the switch of recognition for
Panama was not all one sided. Instead, Panama received much needed resources to update and
fix its most important commodity. China knew this, and utilized the Trump administration’s
hostility towards its LAC allies as an opportunity to flex its soft power. Additionally, concerning
soft power, China sees itself as a global “model in overcoming political and economic
challenges” (Wise 45). Some states like Nicaragua eagerly follow this example, as Daniel Ortega
cited political reasons for Nicaragua’s first switch in recognition. Thus, China’s interest in the
LAC goes beyond just a battle for recognition with Taiwan, and instead can be characterized by
its soft power conflicts with the US, which will be discussed further in this paper; its need for
natural resources; and its political ties with communist leaning states like Cuba, which will not
be focused on here.
Finally, Taiwan’s interest in Panama and Nicaragua are more straightforward: it boils
down to needing overt allies in its fight for sovereignty. Taiwan’s relations with LAC countries
are not explicitly lucrative from an economic standpoint. Taiwan invests millions of dollars into
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its allies in the region, yet it is not reliant upon the LAC market for profit. Taiwan imports very
little from Nicaragua and Panama, and its exports are insignificant next to larger economies like
the US and China. That being said, Taiwan saw value in Nicaragua and Panama outside of trade
agreements, it saw those states as allies in its ongoing battle against China. With Taiwan’s list of
allies growing shorter by the year, China may grow bolder in its moves towards taking Taiwan
via force. Additionally, even if Taiwan was peacefully integrated into China, the balance of
power in Asia would be dramatically tilted in favor of China, more so than it already is. In terms
of soft power, more students from LAC countries would be directed to attend Chinese
universities over Taiwanese schools, which would negatively impact Taiwan’s higher education
system and economy (Ellis 257). Overall, Taiwan seeks to maintain its relations with LAC
countries to better its position against China and to preserve its interests as a sovereign state.
Taiwan’s Free Trade Agreements with Panama and Nicaragua
Panama’s Continuing Free Trade Agreement
Taiwan’s FTAs with Panama and Nicaragua are symbolic of Taiwan’s economic
advances within the Latin American market, and demonstrates the ideological differences
between Nicaragua and Panama. First, it is important to note that FTAs, unlike the joint
communiqués that established relations between Panama and China, and Nicaragua and China,
are very different due to the customized nature of bilateral trade agreements. Additionally, both
of the FTAs are quite long, as they detail the best practices for shipping and trading all types of
goods. For that reason, this section will mainly focus upon the preambulatory clauses of the
documents, initial provisions, and national treatment and market access in both documents, with
some other highlighted portions depending on the signatories. While the rest of the information
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in the documents are important logistically, there is no need to address the measures on matters
such as sanitary and phytosanitary issues in this paper.
Negotiations for Panama and Taiwan’s FTA started in 2001 after Taiwan was admitted
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a “separate customs territory” 300 (Wu and Liao
294). The FTA was finalized in 2003 and went into effect in 2004. The validity of the trade
agreement came under question when Panama switched its recognition to the PRC in 2017,
especially with the One China Policy in place, as that might make the FTA legally null and void.
However, under international law, specifically Article 63 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, the breaking of diplomatic relations would not impact the validity of the treaty, as
“legal relations established by treaties and diplomatic ties are legally independent” (Wu and Liao
294). Therefore, when Laurentino Cortizo of the Democratic Revolutionary Party was elected
president of Panama in 2019, he was able to halt negotiations for a new FTA with the PRC that
had been initiated by Valera’s government, opting to maintain the one between the ROC and
Panama instead. In essence, any treaties established between Panama and the ROC are still in
effect, regardless of the One China Policy, due to the legal nature of treaty law and its
enforcement.
The FTA between Taiwan and Panama begins with a list of preambulatory clauses,
which, while they do not act as operative clauses that include such measures as enforcement and
funding, simply establish agreed upon statements that both entities acknowledge to be true.
There are three preambulatory clauses of import to this paper, the first of which states that
Panama and Taiwan both “Recognize the difference in the levels of development and in the size
of their economies and the need to create opportunities for economic development;” (Free Trade
Agreement between the Republic of China and the Republic of Panama 1). This clause is
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especially important for a few reasons, the first being that the states both recognize an economic
power difference, but do not explicitly state which entity has the more developed economy. Part
of Panama’s motivation to sign onto this agreement was to open up trade borders with a richer
state with a larger economy and to reduce trade barriers between the two. Additionally, the
subsequent section of this paper will explore the significance of investment from Taiwan into
Panama in the form of development projects, which can also be seen in the language of “the need
to create opportunities for economic development.”
The next two preambulatory clauses of import hit upon the idea that both Taiwan and
Panama are democracies working towards the betterment of their own people through economic
growth and other means. Specifically, the clauses read that both states
Create employment opportunities and improve living standards of their people in
their respective territories; [and] Promote economic development in a manner
consistent with environmental protection, conservation, and sustainable
development (Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and the
Republic of Panama 1).
In essence, these clauses address the people of Taiwan and Panama, not necessarily the
corporations and governments that stand to benefit from free trade. Generally, countries with
dictatorships display concern about human rights without really enacting meaningful legislation
on the matter. Thus, one of the reasons that negotiations for an FTA between the PRC and
Panama may have fallen through was a disparity in ideological values. Furthermore, while the
first preambulatory clause in this set directly concerns human populations, the second addresses
the growing global issue of environmental deterioration. The PRC presents a poor record with
environmental abuse, whereas Taiwan and Panama face an immediate crisis with rising sea
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levels. So, while the preambulatory clauses do not necessarily enact any substantial treaty
language, they reflect the synchronization of democratic values between Panama and Taiwan
that is not present between China and Panama.
The initial provisions mainly concern the lines of consistency within the document and
how preceding or post hoc treaties are to be dealt with in accordance with the FTA, but there is
also one article of note in this section. Article 1.02, which acts as the enforcement mechanism for
the FTA, states that “each Party shall ensure the adoption of all necessary measures in
accordance with its constitutional rules in order to comply with the provisions of this Agreement
in its territory and in all levels of its government,” (Free Trade Agreement between the Republic
of China and the Republic of Panama 2). While there are specifically no consequences listed here
for failure to comply with this treaty, the enforcement and enactment mechanism in place is that
both entities will pass legislation to comply with the measures of the FTA. The key words in this
treaty are that the adoption of all measures will occur in “its territory and all levels of
government.” This is particularly interesting in Panama’s case because as of 2017 they subscribe
to the One China Policy. The One China Policy conflicts with this article, as it supposes that the
parties to the agreement have control of their own territories and governments at all levels, which
also presupposes sovereignty. If there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it, this FTA
would have had to go through the PRC government for approval as well, as of 2017 that is, and
this FTA would also apply to Chinese territory, which it does not, especially as Panama does not
currently have an FTA with China. Overall, this article brings into question the validity of the
FTA as a whole after Panama’s switch of recognition, and it begs the question: does changing
recognition influence Taiwan’s sovereign status from the Panamanian perspective?
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In Chapter 3 of the FTA between Taiwan and Panama, there are three articles of
particular interest, the first of which is Article 3.03 Subclause 2, which states that
…each Party shall grant the goods of the other Party the treatment no less
favorable than the most favorable treatment granted by this Party to the like,
directly competitive or substitutable goods of its national origin (Free Trade
Agreement between the Republic of China and the Republic of Panama 11).
The subsequent clause, Article 3.04 Subclause 1 on the tariff reduction schedule further states
that “Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties commit themselves to ensuring
access to their respective markets by means of elimination of customs duties,” on items
described later in the agreement (Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China and the
Republic of Panama 11). Both of these clauses grant ease of access to domestic markets in a
reciprocal fashion so as to better the economic functions of both entities party to the agreement
via free trade. Economists have asserted for years that free trade and reducing barriers to
international markets allows for specialization in market economies, thereby leaving both trade
partners better off than when they started. This simple idea has prevailed through these FTAs,
and in this particular case it allows for Panama to specialize in producing goods and services that
pertain to agriculture and its other large export commodities, and Taiwan can specialize in
technological manufacturing and the like. It is for this reason, that is to say the betterment of the
Panamanian economy, that would sway Panama towards maintaining diplomatic relations with
Taiwan. However, it has found a middle ground where it can still uphold this FTA, which grants
it “no less favorable treatment,” and access to Taiwan’s domestic market without excessive
tariffs, as delegated by this agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
and initiate diplomatic relations with the PRC.
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The interesting aspect with Panama’s situation is that it has yet to enter into an FTA with
China. As previously mentioned, Valera’s government attempted to negotiate an FTA with the
PRC, but this was halted when he left office. From an economic standpoint, it is important to
note that China and Panama signed a document entitled Memorando de Entendimiento entre el
Ministerio de Comercio e Industrias de la República de Panamá y el Ministerio de Comercio de
la República Popular China para el inicio del estudio conjunto de factibilidad para un acuerdo de
libre comercio entre Panamá y China.5 The existence of this memorandum proves that both
China and Panama at one point wanted to negotiate an FTA, but the preambulatory clauses of
this document are of great import as it mentions that both countries are “Deseando fortalecer la
cooperación bilateral para construir conjuntamente el Cinturón Económico de la Ruta de la Seda
y la Ruta Marítima de la Seda del siglo XXII…”6 (Memorando de Entendimiento 1). Herein lies
one of the primary reasons for Panama’s switch of recognition to the PRC: China is willing to
finance investment projects to bring Panama into the fold of the BRI and China’s new Silk Road.
Panama stands to greatly benefit from a Chinese investment in development, which will be
further discussed in the next section, but for now, it is key as a foundational aspect of the future
potential of an FTA between the PRC and Panama. That being said, Panama will likely maintain
its FTA with Taiwan because of the readily available market with another democratic capitalist
nation that shares similar interests with Panama, and is still willing to maintain that market
openness, even though the entities no longer share diplomatic ties.

5

Translation by Roxanne Rogers: Memorandum of understanding between the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
of Panama and the Ministry of Commerce of China to initiate a joint study on the feasibility for an FTA between
Panama and China.
6
Translation by Roxanne Rogers: Desiring to strengthen bilateral cooperation to jointly construct the Silk Road
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century.
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Nicaragua’s Economic Break with the Republic of China
The FTA between Nicaragua and the ROC came into effect in 2008, only a year into
Ortega’s second regime, but it had been negotiated and signed during Enrique Bolaños’s tenure
(2002-2007). Thus, it is important to consider that Ortega did not take part directly in the
negotiation of this agreement, and may not have felt any obligation to uphold it. In the same
vein, Nicaragua unilaterally left the FTA with the ROC in early 2022, only a month or so after
breaking formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. An FTA with China is now rumored to be in
the works, something that Panama attempted but later backed out of. Before analyzing this
document, it must be said that Ortega’s Nicaragua is not in a good economic position, and it is
aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. For this reason, turning to China as a larger trade
partner may seem like a better move for Ortega, but China is not necessarily looking to establish
relations with Nicaragua to just have to support it financially. Bearing that in mind, the rest of
this section will focus on certain preambulatory clauses, initial provisions, and the termination
clause, which has become rather pertinent in the Nicaraguan case.
The two preambulatory clauses of particular interest are increasingly favorable to
Nicaragua and enhance its market both domestically and internationally. This makes sense as
Nicaragua was in need economically, as one of the poorest states in the Western Hemisphere.
For instance, one of the preambulatory clause reads
Ensure a predictable commercial framework for business planning and
investment, by promoting and strengthening efforts to attract Taiwanese
investments to the Republic of Nicaragua, and for the purpose of transferring
technology that contributes to the development of the competitiveness of the
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Republic of Nicaragua’s productive sectors; (Free Trade Agreement between the
Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Nicaragua 1).
The first part of this clause seems even handed for Taiwan and Nicaragua, but it quickly turns its
favorability towards Nicaragua. While investment opportunities in Nicaragua are beneficial for
Taiwan on paper, an influx of money into the Nicaraguan economy would greatly support the
Nicaraguan people, and later Daniel Ortega and his allies. This might be one of the reasons why
Ortega maintained this FTA: to improve his own standing and not take a financial hit while still
recognizing Taiwan. The other language of note in this clause is the “transferring of technology”
to Nicaragua to help their own production and manufacturing sectors. Again, on paper Taiwan is
getting a fair deal as their technology manufacturers get to sell to Nicaraguan businesses without
the hindrances of trade barriers but, at the same time, Nicaragua is able to grow its production
sector and, at least hypothetically, make more money down the line with a stronger production
sector in place. The fact that this is included in the preambulatory clauses also indicated that both
entities see this as a statement of mutual interest. For this reason, it would seem that Taiwan was
amenable to supporting Nicaragua financially to some extent in exchange for the existence of the
FTA and diplomatic recognition.
The second preambulatory clause of import also focuses on Nicaragua’s national interest
over Taiwan’s. As such, it reads that both entities “Recognize the interest of the Republic of
Nicaragua in strengthening and deepening their regional economic integration;” (Free Trade
Agreement between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Nicaragua 2). At first
glance, this clause does not pertain to Taiwan in any way, shape, or form. However, Nicaragua is
recognizing Taiwan as a stepping stone along the way for its ultimate goal of reaching regional
integration in Central America. For Nicaragua to become a bigger part of the regional economy,
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it must first strengthen its own economic prospects and make itself appealing to its neighbors in
LAC as a place of business and investment. As with the previously discussed clause, Taiwan
seemingly gets nothing in return for this clause, but it is important to keep in mind that Taiwan is
able to maintain its relations with Nicaragua through this agreement, and this is simply a
preambulatory clause, not an operative one.
Chapter 1 Article 1.02 discusses the ultimate goals of the FTA pertaining to what both
states should supposedly hope to get out of this FTA. Most importantly, the main text of the
article reads that “The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its
principles and rules, including national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and
transparency,” (Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the
Republic of Nicaragua 1-1). The key words in this article are most-favored-nation (MFN)
treatment, as that means that both states will treat each other with equal trade advantages within
their own markets. This implies that tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade will be reduced to the
appropriate levels. However, this FTA adds another layer to MFN status with subclause d, which
states that both entities will “substantially increase investment opportunities in the territories of
the Parties;” (Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic
of Nicaragua 1-1). While this subclause is reciprocal, there is a catch due to the reality of this
economic partnership: Nicaragua is in much greater need for investment while Taiwan is in a
much better position to invest than Nicaragua is. Therefore, this subclause once again favors
Nicaragua over Taiwan.
These overtly favorable clauses towards Nicaragua beg the question why did Nicaragua
switch recognition and leave this trade agreement? For one, China has a much larger economy
than Taiwan, and is better suited to support Nicaragua financially through the BRI and other
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development and investment projects. Furthermore, Taiwan had to balance many of its loans and
development projects in Nicaragua with its relations with the US (which will be discussed in the
next section).
All in all, Nicaragua saw China as a better business partner financially and ideologically,
so this switch is more beneficial to them. However, the manner in which Nicaragua attempted to
leave this FTA was illegal according to international law, as it sought to unilaterally leave the
agreement immediately. This was a poor choice for two reasons: the FTA had a termination
clause in place and it was costly for Nicaraguan companies. The termination clause in the FTA
states that a party to the agreement can withdraw after a notification period of 180 days (Free
Trade Agreement between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Nicaragua 24-1).
Nicaragua under the Ortega regime attempted to leave this agreement unilaterally and abruptly,
thereby violating the treaty and dragging Nicaraguan companies down with it. Many companies
have appealed to the Taiwanese government for a buffer period until July 1, which will allow for
shipments from Taiwan that were ordered under the FTA but delayed due to the COVID-19
pandemic, to be delivered to Nicaragua under FTA guidelines (Taiwan to cease implementation
of Nicaragua FTA on July 1 online). Taiwan has approved this buffer period even though the
FTA is now considered void under international law, for with bilateral treaties if one side
violates the provisions, the terms are henceforth considered null and void.
Overall, these two FTAs reflect the relations between Taiwan and Panama and Nicaragua
as they stood prior to their switches of recognition in a way that also indicates why these
switches may have been beneficial to the LAC parties. However, these treaties only illustrate a
part of the economic reasoning behind the switches, as development under ODA and the BRI are
also key to understanding this issue.
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Development Wars: Belt and Road Initiative against Official Development Assistance
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
China and Taiwan’s competition for recognition in LAC is accompanied by investments
from the private and public sectors in major projects occurring in the region. China’s major
investment in the region takes the form of the BRI in Panama and the Grand Interoceanic Canal
in Nicaragua. Taiwan’s projects are under its official development assistance and the Taiwanese
International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), which are prominent in both
Nicaragua and Panama.
China’s investments in Panamanian infrastructure projects mainly takes the form of
private investments in ports, canal expansion projects, and railroad construction. However, many
of these projects were started under Valera and then stalled after the Cortizo government came
into power. One of these major projects included building a railroad between Panama City and
David in the Chiriquí province, which is close to the Costa Rican border. In July of 2018,
Chinese and Panamanian officials exchanged letters of understanding on how to execute such a
project. The letter from Panama states that
El Gobierno chino se compromete a realizar el estudio de factibilidad del
Proyecto Ferroviario de la Provincia de Panamá con la cooperación no
reembolsable ofrecida por el Gobierno chino. La Empresa Corporación de Diseño
de Ferrocarril de China, con alta calificación y destacado historial en el campo de
su desempeño será la entidad ejecutora designada por la Parte china para la
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realización del estudio de factibilidad del proyecto,7 (Agreement regarding the
implementation of the feasibility study of the railway project 1).
There are two points of particular importance in this excerpt, the first of which is that Panama
and China were simply entering into an agreement to study the feasibility of this railway. This $4
billion railway was to connect Panama City and David by high-speed train, a project that would
have changed travel in Panama as it extends for 276 miles. However, the project was promptly
canceled, among others, when Cortizo came into power and sought to improve relations between
the US and Panama. Thus, while this project was never fully underway as the study was being
conducted, the project and Panama took a hit with this cancellation (Ellis 260). The second
important point from this quote is the fact that a private company would be taking on the brunt of
the study and design of the railway. This is significant because the Chinese government would
thereby not be attached in name to the study except in these letters. Furthermore, Taiwan’s
ODAs are part of direct government funding, while China has the wherewithal through its
private sector to delegate these sorts of projects. An important note on the Chinese private sector
is that, for the most part, large corporations are in part or whole owned by the CCP and the
government and are thereby called state owned enterprises (SOE). So, the Chinese government
can in name not be attached to a project when a company like the Chinese Railway Design
Corporation takes over, but in reality, the government is in a lot more control behind the scenes.
Many other Chinese projects were canceled or postponed during the Cortizo
administration. For instance, a fourth bridge was to be built over the Panama Canal, but Panama

7

Translation by Roxanne Rogers: The Chinese government commits to carry out a study on the feasibility of the
Panamanian Provincial Railway Project with the non-reimbursable cooperation of the Chinese government. The
Chinese Railway Design Corporation, with its high qualifications and impressive history, will be the executing
entity of this study as designated by the government of China.
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is still the first Latin American country to join the BRI. Through this deal, China granted Panama
$500 million and began work on expanding the Panama Canal. Furthermore, “the Landbridge
Group, a Chinese state-owned company, signed a $900 million deal for control of Margarita
Island Port,” which is a key commercial hub in Panama (III, Lem and Paudel 562). With an SOE
purchasing control of a key port in Panama and bringing it into the fold of the BRI, China
exhibits a crucial interest in Panamanian affairs and its geopolitical standing in the region. Even
more pertinently, the Landbridge Group deal and Panama’s joining of the BRI both happened in
2016, prior to the diplomatic switch of recognition. It is therefore viable to say that Panama
switched its recognition to be able to reap even more benefits from BRI programs, and that
China was using infrastructure investment and BRI projects to entice Panama into switching
recognition.
China’s investments into Nicaragua are similar to that of Panama due to their ambitious
nature and propensity to halt and stall. The biggest of these projects is the Grand Interoceanic
Canal, which was first proposed in 2012. The main idea of the project was to build a canal that
would rival that of Panama in size and use. The initial plans for the canal detailed a much larger
capacity than that of the Panama Canal, totaling 250,000 deadweight ton capacity for boats,
while the Panama Canal can only manage 130,000 deadweight tons (Trejo 82). The funding for
this $50 billion dollar project would come from Hong Kong Nicaragua Development, a company
registered in Hong Kong but is suspected to be supported by the Chinese government as only the
CCP and Beijing could fund this large scale of a project (Arcia 182). Further, China has political
and economic interests in building a new canal, especially in Nicaragua. Nicaragua on the other
hand, has very little incentive to do the project, as it involves the concession of the canal to Hong
Kong Nicaragua Development, making it so that Nicaragua would only see a 1% return rate
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within the first 50 years of the deal (Arcia 182). Additionally, the project would have tremendous
impacts on the environment, migration, food security, and indigenous communities. The
Nicaraguan constitution and many other treaties would be violated if this canal is built, which
puts the Ortega regime in a hard position. Finally, the canal would put Nicaragua into the BRI,
which would only indebt it even more to China. The only true positive that Nicaragua found in
the short term was that Taiwan increased its foreign aid and investments into Nicaragua as the
project progress in 2014 and 2015. Since then, the construction of the canal has been stalled, but
the concession still stands. In speculation, Nicaragua may have switched its recognition to China
so as to expedite and restart this project, but there are so many domestic obstacles that this canal
project may never get off the ground in Nicaragua.
Taiwan’s Official Development Assistance
Taiwan takes a different approach to development assistance abroad than China does,
even though their motives for providing this assistance are similarly self-interested. Taiwan’s
ODA to LAC in general can be broken down into five different categories: social infrastructure,
economic sectors, economic infrastructures, special purpose grants, and sustainable
development. The money that funds these projects comes from Taiwan ICDF and more specific
funds like the Central America Trade Office and Central American Economic Development.
These programs and funds were started to aid in the investment of Taiwanese money into LAC
projects and to ease access of LAC countries to the Taiwanese market. The ODA category
“Social infrastructure and services,” receives the most amount of funding, with about 49% of
ICDF money spent on “education, scholarships, vocational training, health care, water supply
and sanitation, and government and civil society,” (Teng, Taiwan and its Latin American Allies
198). In Nicaragua alone, nine out of 13 projects funded by Taiwanese ODA were related to
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building and maintaining social and economic infrastructure (Teng, Taiwan and its Latin
American Allies 198). However, while these social and economic projects play an important role
in the ROC’s international relations, the category of interest is that of special purpose grants.
These grants have been used by Taiwan to reward elites from its LAC allies to ensure their
continued support. About 20% of ODA funds are spent on these grants, indicating that the ROC
is highly interested in maintaining these alliances and will send money directly to its supporters
abroad (Teng, Taiwan and its Latin American Allies 198).
In the Taiwanese private sector, which unlike China is truly private in nature, businesses
also invest into projects abroad in places like Panama and Nicaragua. For instance, Taiwanese
investment totals around $145.02 million in the clothing, hospitality, and electronics sectors,
among others (Fan 4). Some larger companies created Nica Eastern Development Inc. which
operates “hotels, shopping malls and conference centers in Nicaragua,” (Fan 4). Nicaragua was
investing in projects in Taiwan as well, but those investments only totaled to $13,000. Thus,
while Nicaragua suffered from the loss of Taiwanese investment into the Nicaraguan projects,
Nicaragua did not lose a significant investment market after it switched recognition. However,
China and Taiwan do not only use dollar diplomacy to acquire allies, especially as China’s soft
power is on the rise.
Propaganda and Vaccines for Resources and Access: How and why the Republic of China
and the People’s Republic of China Influence the Region
The PRC has many different reasons to increase its presence in LAC, but the COVID-19
pandemic that began in December of 2019 affords the PRC a new opportunity to flex its soft
power in the region and gain new allies. However, the pandemic was not the only way in which
the PRC utilized its soft power, as states in LAC received benefits such as the opening of new
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economic markets and the redirection of Asian focused students from Taiwan to China. In
Panama in particular, the PRC was very active with its soft power pursuits as it pertained to
education, economics, and infrastructure.
Panama’s exports are mainly agricultural in nature, but China sees more economic
potential in the state due to its location and unique position in the Western Hemisphere. Panama
is home to the Panama Canal, the only link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans besides the
southernmost tip of South America. Shipping products through this canal is both lucrative for
international businesses and Panama as it promotes itself as an economic entity. Panama
therefore sought to improve its infrastructure through the newly established Chinese relations, as
discussed in the previous section. On top of that, China used its soft power influence to impact
Panama through education and trade. First and foremost, after Panama recognized China, the
PRC set up the Confucius Institute in the University of Panama to promote Chinese studies. This
institution aimed to set up future business relations with LAC students who favor China over
Taiwan, and are well versed enough in Chinese culture and language that they will be effective
business partners in the future. Just like the infrastructure, this is a type of investment that China
is making in the Panamanian youth that they hope will pay off in the future (Ellis 260).
Concerning economics, Panama experienced a trade boom with China following its
recognition of the PRC. As such, Panamanian exports to the PRC grew from 2 million USD in
2002 to 42.7 million USD in 2017, right when they established diplomatic relations. This is
particularly interesting because China does not necessarily need any of the products that Panama
exports, as Panama is an agricultural exporter and China is in need of natural resources like oil.
On the flip side, Chinese exports to Panama grew from 40.8 million USD in 2012 to 1.24 billion
in 2017, which is also staggering considering the fact that Panama and China do not currently
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have an FTA (Ellis 261). However, on the whole, China’s newfound economic presence in
Panama has increased to a point that is substantially important for Panama and its economy,
which might hint at an economic incentive in Panama’s recognition of the PRC over the ROC.
Another way in which China has been able to influence LAC in a political manner
concerns the CCP and its foreign relations. While the CCP runs the government of China, it also
acts as a separate and frankly more powerful organ of the Chinese state. The CCP also has many
bodies that operate inside it, including the International Liaison Department (ILD), which
initiates and maintains relations between the CCP and other political parties in other countries.
This structure is significant because it allows for the CCP to spread pro-China news and
information abroad, and is therefore another way for China to exert its soft power. Importantly,
between 2002 and 2017, “the ILD held nearly 300 meetings with 74 different political parties in
26 countries in LAC,” (Berg 5). Additionally, these meetings hold direct influence over
important deals and decisions happening between the PRC and countries like Panama. For
instance, before the PRC announced a deal with Panama to invest in infrastructure projects
involving the Panama Canal, the ILD met with the ruling party in Panama at the time. Thus, the
ILD stands to improve political relations with other states, even those with disparate values, so as
to promote the CCP and China internationally.
The final soft power measure that China has used specifically as it pertains to Panama is
that of medical or vaccine diplomacy. Medical diplomacy became widely known during the
COVID-19 pandemic and it involved powerful countries engaging in semi-coercive activities
with other states over the shipment of much needed medical supplies. The best example was
when the COVID-19 vaccine first became available in 2021, but there was a limited supply, so
countries with access to vaccines use them as leverage in other diplomatic scenarios. China’s
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medical diplomacy works in conjunction with its corporations too, especially as it pertains to
Panama. In April 2020, the Chinese government had sent Panama “5,000 test kits, 2,000 masks,
3,000 bottles of disinfectants, and 6,000 gloves,” while companies like Alibaba (the Chinese
equivalent of Amazon) and Huawei (the 5G telecommunications giant) had donated “100,000
masks, 10,080 test kits, 5,000 ventilators,” and more (Ellis 261). Interestingly, these donations
reinforce to Panama the lucrative nature of its financial relations with China, and it also
demonstrates to states like Nicaragua, who at the time still recognized Taiwan, that China was a
beneficial ally to have in such a global health crisis.
Nicaragua’s interaction with China’s soft power is slightly different from that of
Panama’s due to its different economic and political situations. In general, the COVID-19
pandemic not only created an opening for China to expand its influence in LAC, but it also gave
ROC recognizing countries more reasons to switch their recognition. In the first few months of
the pandemic, Taiwan demonstrated continued loyalty to its allies in Central America, Nicaragua
included. Taiwan sent a total of 6.6 million masks among other medical equipment to four of its
Central American allies, and Nicaragua alone received $1.5 million worth of medical equipment
(Ellis 269). That being said, the ROC can simply not compete on the same level as the PRC
when it comes to economic relief and access, and with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic,
Nicaragua is in more economic trouble than it can ultimately withstand. As such, with economic,
social, and political instability on the rise, Nicaragua looked to the PRC to increase market
access, win over the Nicaraguan people, and help with governmental financial issues.
Nicaragua is an interesting case due to its fluctuating relationship with the PRC. In 1985,
when Ortega recognized the PRC for the first time for political reasons, that recognition was
accompanied by 20 million USD in foreign aid and 7 million USD in military assistance. Foreign
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and military aid seem to be the only economic advantages for Nicaragua in its relationship with
the PRC as it stands due to the uneven trade standards. Nicaragua’s exports to the PRC grew
from “zero in 2002 to a modest $28.6 million in 2019,” (Ellis 269). Furthermore, on the import
side, PRC exports to Nicaragua increased from “zero to $893.9 million,” (Ellis 269). This
disparity between imports and exports indicates a clear loss for Nicaragua, but this economic
relationship is not simply defined in bilateral terms. The US is one of Nicaragua’s largest trading
partners, with the trade partnership resulting in $5.23 billion in 2019 alone. Furthermore,
agreements like the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTADR), to which Nicaragua and the US are both parties too, act as major boons to Nicaragua’s
struggling economy. However, the US has placed sanctions on Ortega and his government after
the 2018 protests, driving Nicaragua to look elsewhere for investment and trade partners. This
puts China in an ideal position to wield its soft power in the region, as it not only can promote its
own interests with regards to Nicaragua, but it can also use its relations with Nicaragua against
Taiwan and the US (Ellis 268).
Trade aside, Nicaragua sees China as a new and valuable ally due to its authoritarian style
regime, which it may seek to emulate. China’s work in the LAC includes promoting repressive
government regimes through the export of surveillance technology. While this has yet to occur in
Nicaragua, Argentina and Ecuador have benefitted from Chinese facial recognition technology,
and Venezuela is now using “Carnetes de la Patria,” or fatherland cards, which function in a
similar way to China’s social credit program. It is therefore foreseeable that the Ortega regime
will use Chinese technology to promote its power within Nicaragua. Furthermore, as previously
mentioned, China has sent military aid to Nicaragua, supporting the repressive ruling
government. China’s support of authoritarian regimes makes it a likelier ally for Nicaragua than
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Taiwan ever was ideologically, especially with the US’s heavy involvement in Taiwanese
international affairs (Berg 6).
Conclusion: What May Be Good News for Latin America and the Caribbean Is Bad News
for the Republic of China
Panama and Nicaragua switched their recognition from the ROC to the PRC within the
past five years due to a variety of economic, political, and social reasons. For Panama, the
political leanings of President Valera matched with a need for funds to upgrade the Panama
Canal and the end of the truce on competing for allies between China and Taiwan set the stage
for Panama’s changing of recognition. On the other hand, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega did not
need much motivation besides renewing Nicaragua’s relations with its former ally, leverage over
the US, and economic relief that was in especially great need in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic. As the pandemic winds down, however, the LAC’s dependence on China may wane,
opening the door for other actors in the region, which would be equally invasive upon the US’s
Monroe Doctrine.
However, while Panama and Nicaragua seem to be better off with their new ally, the
ROC is now in a more unstable position than ever. The PRC has taken note of Russia’s most
recent invasion of Ukraine and has seen the lack of substantial international intervention.
Additionally, Putin’s Russia has violated many international laws and received little to no
consequences for its actions. This could seemingly provide an opening for the PRC to invade the
ROC, especially with the inaction of the international community with concerns to Ukraine, and
with less official allies to back it up, the ROC is in a conceivably dire position. With more and
more countries shifting their foreign policy away from the ROC, they will have a much harder
time defending themselves in the international community. Further, the US may take less of an
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interest in Taiwan if its allies in LAC start looking to China for aid and assistance. Thus, while
LAC countries like Panama and Nicaragua may now be in a better place economically and
politically due to their switches of recognition, Taiwan is in a more precarious position that may
end in its integration into mainland China.
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